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AP U.S. History · Period 3: 1754-1800

Continental Army

Continental Army appears in 3 reviewed AP U.S. History questions and sits in Period 3: 1754-1800. Below are worked examples showing exactly how the exam tests it, with the answer marked and every distractor explained.

The national force created by the Second Continental Congress in June 1775 under George Washington. It was meant to add a national force alongside the colonial militias, one that could fight a European-style war.

Why it matters

Its survival, not its battlefield record, won the war. Its constant near-collapse became the strongest evidence that a Congress without taxing power could not run a country.

How the exam tests it

Stems describe 1777 and 1778: desertion, short enlistments running out, and troops left unpaid and unfed. The credited answer names two failures at once, thin American nationalism among soldiers who thought of themselves as Virginians or Pennsylvanians first, and a Congress that could not tax to supply them.

Don’t confuse it with

Militia were short-term local units under state control. The Continental Army was national, and its food, pay, and clothing depended on requisitions the states routinely ignored.

Continental Army in real questions

Example 1Medium
Historians note that the Continental Army faced a severe desertion problem in 1777-1778: desertions ran at alarming rates. Men from particular states deserted when the army moved far from their home states; others left when their short-term enlistments expired rather than re-enlisting; many simply walked away when the army was not being paid, clothed, or fed. Continental soldiers identified themselves more as Pennsylvanians or Virginians than as Americans. The desertion problem described most directly reflected which challenge of the Revolutionary era?
  1. AWeak American nationalism and persistent state and local loyalties under a central government that lacked adequate national powers to sustain the warCorrect
  2. BA failure of Washington's leadership to inspire loyalty through stirring speeches and the decisive victories that would have kept morale high
  3. CClass conflict between wealthy officers, who had no economic incentive to desert, and poor enlisted men, who resented serving without adequate compensation while officers lived comfortably
  4. DA deliberate British strategy of encouraging desertion through propaganda leaflets that promised good pay, generous land grants, and a full pardon to any Continental soldier who switched sides

Why A is right

The desertion problem illustrated the fundamental weakness of continental nationalism in the Revolutionary period. Soldiers' primary identities and loyalties were to their home states, counties, and communities rather than to an abstract 'American' nation. The Continental Congress's inability under the Articles of Confederation to pay, clothe, or feed the army adequately — because it could not tax and states were reluctant to provide requisitioned supplies — compounded the problem by eliminating even material incentives to remain. This dual problem of weak nationalism and weak central governmental capacity was a central argument of those who later supported a stronger constitution.
Why the other 3 choices miss
B
Incorrect because blaming desertion on Washington's leadership failures is contradicted by the historical record of his extraordinary inspirational leadership; the structural problems of inadequate pay and supplies, and weak continental identity, were systemic rather than the result of individual leadership failure.
C
Incorrect because while class tensions in the Continental Army were real, the pattern of desertion described — particularly the correlation with geographic distance from home states — suggests state loyalty as a more powerful explanatory factor than class conflict.
D
Incorrect because while British propaganda did encourage desertion to some extent, the desertion problem's scale and pattern (particularly state-based desertion when armies moved away from soldiers' home states) suggests state and local loyalty as the primary driver rather than British inducements.

Studied alongside

Other concepts from Period 3: 1754-1800.