"The Battle of Antietam, September 17, 1862: The bloodiest single day in American military history, with 22,717 casualties. Union forces under McClellan technically stopped Lee's invasion of Maryland but failed to pursue the damaged Confederate army. Lincoln used the Union's tactical victory to issue the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation five days later, warning that slaves in Confederate states would be freed on January 1, 1863."
— Modern account of Antietam
Lincoln's decision to issue the Emancipation Proclamation after Antietam rather than earlier in the war most directly reflected which strategic consideration?
- ALincoln waited because Secretary of State Seward, who had initially opposed emancipation outright, first had to be persuaded to support the proclamation before it could be publicly announced to the nation
- BLincoln waited for a military victory because issuing emancipation after defeats would look like the desperate measure of a failing government, weakening the Union's position rather than strengthening itCorrect
- CLincoln delayed emancipation until after Antietam because he was waiting for a decisive Union victory in the Western Theater, where slavery was most economically significant to the Confederate war effort
- DLincoln needed to wait for a Union victory because the Emancipation Proclamation required congressional ratification, which was far more likely to be secured at a moment when Northern morale was running high
Why B is right
Lincoln had drafted a preliminary Emancipation Proclamation in July 1862, but Secretary of State Seward advised against issuing it after the series of Union military defeats that summer (the Seven Days' Battles, Second Bull Run). Seward argued that proclaiming emancipation after defeat would appear 'the last shriek on the retreat' — a desperate measure by a losing government — rather than a confident policy statement from a position of strength. After Antietam provided a technical victory (Lee withdrew from Maryland), Lincoln seized the opportunity to issue the proclamation from a stronger position, giving it the appearance of strength rather than desperation.
Why the other 3 choices miss
- A
- Incorrect because while Seward did advise waiting for a victory, his concern was timing and diplomatic effect, not a fundamental opposition to emancipation that Lincoln needed to overcome; Seward urged tactical patience, not abandonment of emancipation as policy.
- C
- Incorrect because Lincoln waited for a victory in the Eastern Theater (where Lee's Army of Northern Virginia was the primary Confederate force threatening the North), not specifically for a Western Theater victory where slavery was most economically significant.
- D
- Incorrect because the Emancipation Proclamation was issued under presidential war powers authority and did not require congressional ratification; Lincoln issued it as an executive order, making congressional approval irrelevant to its legal validity.
"When Confederate forces fired on Fort Sumter in April 1861, four more slave states — Virginia, Arkansas, Tennessee, and North Carolina — seceded to join the Confederacy. Four slave states — Missouri, Kentucky, Maryland, and Delaware — remained in the Union. Lincoln's handling of the border states was crucial: he suspended habeas corpus in Maryland to prevent secession, and he worked carefully to avoid offending Kentucky's slaveholding Unionists." — Civil War border states, 2008
Which of the following best explains why the author expressed this viewpoint about Lincoln's handling of the border states?
- ATo argue that the loyalty of the border states was militarily irrelevant to the Union, since their populations were small, their industrial output minimal, and their strategic location of no consequence to the larger war effort
- BTo show that Lincoln would use unconstitutional means and tolerate slavery where necessary to preserve the Union, revealing the pragmatic limits of his antislavery commitmentCorrect
- CTo show that Lincoln's diplomatic failures alienated the border states and drove several of them to secede, adding substantially to the Confederacy's territory, population, and war-making resources
- DTo demonstrate that Lincoln's suspension of habeas corpus enjoyed the unanimous backing of the Supreme Court, which upheld each of his wartime emergency measures as a fully constitutional exercise of executive power
Why B is right
Lincoln's handling of the border states illustrates the pragmatic constraints on his antislavery principles: to keep Maryland (which surrounded Washington D.C.) in the Union, he suspended habeas corpus and arrested secessionists without trial; to retain Kentucky's Unionists, he initially avoided threatening slavery where it was legal. This pragmatism — tolerating slavery temporarily to preserve the Union — shows that Lincoln's war aims were initially about union rather than abolition, and that constitutional guarantees were suspended when he deemed military necessity required it.
Why the other 3 choices miss
- A
- Incorrect because the border states were critically important: Maryland surrounded Washington D.C.; Kentucky controlled access to the Tennessee and Cumberland river systems; Missouri controlled the upper Mississippi; losing any of them would have been militarily catastrophic for the Union.
- C
- Incorrect because none of the border states Lincoln was handling — Maryland, Kentucky, Missouri, Delaware — ultimately seceded; Lincoln's diplomacy and coercion kept them in the Union; the passage describes his successful retention of these states, not his failures.
- D
- Incorrect because the Supreme Court did not unanimously uphold Lincoln's habeas corpus suspension; Chief Justice Taney, in Ex parte Merryman (1861), ruled that only Congress could suspend habeas corpus; Lincoln ignored the ruling, illustrating the limits of judicial enforcement against a determined executive during wartime.