Read the following practice passage.
Critics often blame citizens for knowing little about the candidates on their ballots. That criticism misreads the situation. Learning where candidates stand on dozens of issues takes hours of reading, and in an election with millions of participants, the chance that any one ballot decides the outcome is close to zero. A citizen who skips that research is not lazy or careless; she is responding sensibly to the costs and benefits she faces. If we want a better-informed electorate, lecturing voters will accomplish little. The more promising path is to make useful information cheaper and easier to obtain.
The author of the passage would most likely agree with which of the following statements?
- ALow levels of political knowledge reflect a decline in civic virtue, which stronger civics instruction in schools is the best way to reverse
- BVoters who rely on party labels instead of research usually end up choosing candidates whose positions conflict with their own interests
- CMany citizens would probably become better informed about candidates if the time and effort needed to learn about them were reducedCorrect
- DBecause a single ballot rarely decides an election, the choice to turn out and vote at all is irrational for most citizens
Why C is right
The passage argues that citizens stay uninformed because researching candidates is costly while one vote almost never changes the result. That is the logic of rational ignorance: ignorance is a sensible response to costs and benefits, not a character flaw. Since the author says the cost side drives the behavior and calls cheaper, easier information 'the more promising path', the author would agree that lowering the time and effort of learning about candidates would leave more citizens better informed (C). The passage rejects the civic-virtue explanation in A, says nothing about party-label voting in B, and in D defends skipping research, not skipping the vote.
Why the other 3 choices miss
- A
- The passage rejects this view. It says uninformed citizens are 'not lazy or careless' and that 'lecturing voters will accomplish little', so it does not treat low knowledge as a failure of civic virtue that instruction would fix.
- B
- The passage never judges how well uninformed voters choose, and it never mentions party labels. Whether cue-based voting serves voters' interests is a separate debate that the author does not take up.
- D
- This mixes up the passage's claim. The author says it is sensible to skip costly research before voting, not that voting itself is irrational. The passage assumes the citizen still casts a ballot.
The concept of 'median voter theorem' predicts that in a two-candidate election with a single dimension of political competition, candidates will converge toward
- Athe positions endorsed by the most influential interest groups in their respective coalitions regardless of median voter preferences
- Bthe positions that maximize fundraising rather than vote maximization, because campaign resources determine electoral outcomes more than voter preferences
- Cthe position of the median voter — the voter whose preferred position is at the midpoint of the ideological distribution — to maximize electoral supportCorrect
- Dthe most ideologically extreme positions of their respective party bases to maximize turnout among core supporters
Why C is right
Anthony Downs's median voter theorem predicts that in a two-candidate election with single-peaked preferences on a single ideological dimension, rational vote-maximizing candidates will converge toward the median voter's position. A candidate to the left of the median can gain votes by moving rightward (picking up median voters without losing those further left who have no better option), and vice versa, until both candidates cluster at the median. Critics note that the primary election system can prevent convergence by forcing candidates to satisfy primary electorates before competing for the general election median.
Why the other 3 choices miss
- A
- Incorrect because the median voter theorem is a voter-based model of candidate positioning; while interest groups influence candidates, the theorem's prediction is specifically about vote-maximization logic, not interest group accommodation.
- B
- Incorrect because the median voter theorem is a vote-maximization model assuming votes determine outcomes; the theorem does not incorporate fundraising considerations, which are a separate constraint on candidate behavior.
- D
- Incorrect because moving toward the base extremes is the opposite of what the median voter theorem predicts; convergence to the center is the theorem's prediction, not divergence toward the base.