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AP U.S. Government and Politics · Political Participation

Agency capture

Agency capture appears in 3 reviewed AP U.S. Government and Politics questions and sits in Political Participation. Below are worked examples showing exactly how the exam tests it, with the answer marked and every distractor explained.

Agency capture happens when a regulatory agency starts serving the industry it is supposed to police instead of the public. The usual path is the revolving door. Regulators leave for jobs in that industry, and industry insiders get hired as regulators.

Why it matters

It explains why interest groups work on agencies, not just on Congress. An agency that leans on industry for expert staff, data, and future jobs tends to write the rules the industry wants.

How the exam tests it

Expect a table on the revolving door, such as the share of former officials who became lobbyists versus the share who took industry jobs. Check both columns separately, because the group with the lowest lobbying rate may have the highest rate of industry employment. The correct answer must match both columns, so do not stop reading after the first one.

Don’t confuse it with

An iron triangle is the steady three-way alliance of agency, congressional committee, and interest group; agency capture is narrower and means the agency itself has lost its independence to the industry.

Agency capture in real questions

Example 1Easier
The table shows hypothetical data on federal officials who left government service in a single year and what they did within two years of leaving. | Former position | Number who left | % who registered as lobbyists | % employed by a firm in an industry they had overseen | |---|---|---|---| | House members | 50 | 42 | 30 | | Senators | 20 | 55 | 35 | | Senior committee staff | 300 | 28 | 47 | | Executive agency regulators | 500 | 9 | 61 | | Cabinet-level officials | 15 | 20 | 53 | Which of the following statements is best supported by the data in the table?
  1. AFormer agency regulators were the least likely group to register as lobbyists but the most likely to work for an industry they had overseen.Correct
  2. BFormer agency regulators made rulings that favored the industries that later hired them, as shown by their high rate of employment in those industries.
  3. CMore former senators than former House members registered as lobbyists within two years of leaving office.
  4. DFormer senior committee staff registered as lobbyists at a higher rate than former members of either chamber did.

Why A is right

The table illustrates the 'revolving door': officials leave government for lobbying or for jobs in the industries they used to oversee. Reading the lobbying column, executive agency regulators have the lowest rate of any group (9%). Reading the industry-employment column, they have the highest rate (61%, above cabinet officials' 53% and committee staff's 47%). Their route through the revolving door is mostly direct industry employment, not registered lobbying. Choice A is the only statement that matches both columns. The other choices confuse rates with counts, read the wrong rows, or claim causation the data cannot show.
Why the other 3 choices miss
B
This is an unsupported causal leap. The table shows only where former regulators went to work (61%). It has no data on how they ruled while in office, so it cannot show that their decisions favored their future employers.
C
This confuses a percentage with a count. Senators had the higher lobbying rate (55% vs. 42%), but only 11 of 20 senators registered, compared with 21 of 50 House members, so more House members became lobbyists.
D
This reads the wrong rows. Committee staff registered at 28%, which is lower than both House members (42%) and senators (55%).

Studied alongside

Other concepts from Political Participation.