A state's control over money — issuing currency, expanding or restricting the money supply, setting interest rates, and choosing an exchange-rate regime. In most modern cases a central bank runs it, and it is the lever authorities pull to stimulate trade or to defend the value of the currency.
Why it matters
Money supply decisions have the same core trade-off in every era: issuing more currency lubricates commerce and government revenue, but issuing too much destroys the currency's value. Globalization sharpens the squeeze, since capital flight and IMF conditionality limit how freely a state can act.
How the exam tests it
One stem is a Song dynasty memorial on paper money. It praises the currency for sparing merchants the haulage of copper coin, then warns that issuing too much will collapse its value. The credited answer names that tension: commercial growth against inflation risk. Treat it as a cross-period comparison item. The memorial is dated about 1090, which is before the course period opens in 1200, so the document itself is a pre-period source. Do not stretch that point to the subject. Song China's commercialized economy is tested Unit 1 content under Topic 1.1, c. 1200 to c. 1450, and that includes market growth, expanded foreign trade, and paper money. Only this document's date falls outside the course window. Know the real chronology. Jiaozi began with Sichuan merchant consortia in the early 1000s, the state took over issuing them in 1024, and paper currency only circulated across the empire as Southern Song huizi from the 1160s. For Unit 9 itself, learn three anchors. In August 1971 Nixon ended the dollar's convertibility into gold, and by 1973 the major currencies floated against each other. IMF loans came with conditions — devalue, cut subsidies, privatize — under structural adjustment. Then came the crises: Mexico's peso collapsed in December 1994, and Thailand's baht broke in July 1997 and dragged much of East Asia down with it.
Don’t confuse it with
Fiscal policy, which is taxing and spending. Monetary policy works on the quantity and price of money itself. Thailand tightened both at once in 1997. Its central bank burned foreign reserves and drove interest rates up to defend the baht, until the peg broke on 2 July. The IMF program agreed that August then forced budget cuts on top of the high rates. Contractionary monetary policy and contractionary fiscal policy stacked on the same recession, which is why the program was blamed for deepening the slump.