The comparative frame the course uses for large land empires losing effective control: military overextension drains revenue, tax burdens rise, elites who once supplied troops and taxes are alienated, and regional strongmen keep resources that once flowed to the capital.
Why it matters
The course wants you to compare, not narrate, so learn the frame and then check the fit. It describes the Mughal case closely and the Qing case more loosely. It fits the Safavids better than their sudden ending suggests: fiscal shortfall after Shah Abbas, court factionalism, a decayed standing army, and revolts on the Baluch, Lezgi, and Afghan frontiers ran for decades before 1722. A modest Ghilzai force could take Isfahan because the state was already hollow. What is distinctive there is the speed of the final blow, an outside conquest rather than a slow devolution to regional strongmen. Ottoman decline is contested by specialists, who read the 1600s and 1700s as transformation and decentralization rather than one decay curve.
How the exam tests it
Questions ask what argument about imperial governance a source best supports, so the right answer is stated as a general rule rather than as a fact about one ruler. Expect wording about policies that alienate key constituencies undermining stability.
Don’t confuse it with
Decline is not the same as conquest or collapse; empires usually strain fiscally and politically for decades before any outside power finishes them.