In NSC-68 (1950), the policy document principally drafted by Paul Nitze, the authors argued that the United States could accept no further appeasement on the model of Munich, that aggressor nations must be checked early, and that containment required opposing communist advances of every kind — defining no region as truly 'peripheral' to American security.
A historian could best use this source to support which of the following arguments?
- ANitze's universal containment doctrine was explicitly endorsed by Eisenhower, who immediately implemented it by committing conventional American forces to defend every anticommunist government worldwide regardless of strategic value or cost
- BNitze's position represented a fringe view within the Truman administration, rejected by most senior officials who preferred George Kennan's narrower, political rather than military, conception of selective containment
- CNSC-68's expansive view, defining virtually any communist advance anywhere as a threat to U.S. security, framed the Korean War and later Vietnam interventionCorrect
- DNSC-68 was primarily motivated by domestic political concerns about Republican attacks on Truman's foreign policy rather than by any genuine strategic assessment of Soviet military capabilities, intentions, or ideology
Why C is right
NSC-68 (April 1950) represented a dramatic expansion of American Cold War strategy. Where George Kennan's original 1947 containment concept focused on selective defense of vital industrial-military centers, NSC-68 argued that any Soviet advance anywhere threatened global equilibrium and American security. This expansive logic justified intervention wherever communist movements appeared. The Korean War outbreak (June 1950) provided the immediate political opportunity to implement NSC-68's defense spending recommendations. Its logic would eventually help justify Vietnam intervention as well.
Why the other 3 choices miss
- A
- Incorrect because Eisenhower rejected NSC-68's expensive conventional military build-up in favor of his 'New Look' strategy emphasizing nuclear deterrence and fiscal restraint; he refused to defend 'every anticommunist government' and accepted the loss of North Vietnam without military intervention.
- B
- Incorrect because while Kennan did criticize NSC-68's militarization of containment, the document represented the mainstream Truman administration position, not a fringe view; Truman approved NSC-68 and used Korea to fund its defense spending recommendations.
- D
- Incorrect because while domestic politics were part of the context, NSC-68 was based on genuine strategic analysis of Soviet military capabilities and Marxist ideology's expansionist implications; characterizing it primarily as domestic politics misrepresents the substantive Cold War analysis it contained.