The table shows hypothetical demographic data for four world regions.
| Region | Population, 2020 (millions) | Total fertility rate | Crude death rate, 2000 (per 1,000) | Crude death rate, 2020 (per 1,000) | Net migration rate (per 1,000) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| W | 1,400 | 1.7 | 7 | 8 | -0.2 |
| X | 1,100 | 4.6 | 16 | 9 | -0.5 |
| Y | 60 | 5.8 | 18 | 11 | -1.0 |
| Z | 450 | 2.1 | 9 | 9 | +3.5 |
A demographer projects that one of these regions will account for the largest share of global population growth between 2020 and 2050. Which of the following best identifies that region and the evidence in the table that supports the projection?
- ARegion Y, because it has the highest fertility rate and the steepest drop in its crude death rate
- BRegion W, because its base population is so large that it will add the most births despite its low fertility
- CRegion Z, because its positive net migration adds residents while fertility holds at replacement level
- DRegion X, because it pairs a large base population with above-replacement fertility and falling mortalityCorrect
- ERegion X, because its crude death rate in 2020 was the lowest of the four regions in the table
Why D is right
Absolute population growth depends on both the size of the base and the rate of natural increase. In the table, Region X combines a large population (1,100 million) with a total fertility rate of 4.6, well above the replacement level of 2.1, and a crude death rate that fell sharply from 16 to 9. That combination of high fertility, falling mortality, and a large base, which also implies a young age structure and built-in population momentum, will add far more people than tiny high-fertility Region Y, aging Region W, or migration-fed Region Z. This is the pattern behind projections that Sub-Saharan Africa will drive most global growth to 2050.
Why the other 4 choices miss
- A
- Region Y does have the highest TFR and the largest CDR drop (18 to 11), but its base of only 60 million means even rapid natural increase adds far fewer people in absolute terms than Region X; this confuses growth rate with absolute growth.
- B
- Region W has the largest population, but its TFR of 1.7 is below replacement and its death rate is rising (7 to 8), signs of an aging population headed toward stagnation or decline, not the largest absolute growth.
- E
- Region X is the correct region, but the reason misreads the table: its 2020 crude death rate (9) is higher than Region W's (8) and equal to Region Z's, so it is not the lowest.
- C
- Region Z's net migration (+3.5) and replacement-level fertility (2.1) yield only modest growth on a base of 450 million; migration moves people between regions and does not create most of global growth.
In the 1990s, structural adjustment programs required many sub-Saharan African nations to reduce agricultural subsidies as a condition for international loans. Which documented consequence followed in several countries?
- AVertical integration of agribusiness immediately replaced state enterprises, maintaining prior production levels across the affected regions
- BFertilizer use rose sharply as private dealers supplied cheaper inputs, raising maize yields among smallholders
- CDomestic food prices fell as more efficient private markets quickly replaced the former state-managed distribution systems
- DSmallholder farmers reduced fertilizer use as input subsidies ended, lowering yields and worsening food insecurityCorrect
- EAgricultural exports increased rapidly, generating foreign exchange that fully offset the loss of domestic subsidies
Why D is right
Structural adjustment programs (SAPs) required cuts to state agricultural subsidies — including fertilizer, seed, and credit programs — that smallholder farmers depended on. Without affordable inputs, many farmers reduced fertilizer applications, crop yields fell, and food security worsened. This outcome is documented in countries like Malawi and Zambia, and led to subsequent debates about the value of targeted input subsidies.
Why the other 4 choices miss
- A
- Private agribusiness did not immediately replace state enterprises in most sub-Saharan African cases; the gap in agricultural services was not quickly filled by the private sector.
- B
- This reverses the documented outcome. Private dealers did not supply cheaper inputs once subsidies ended. Fertilizer became more expensive and less available to smallholders, so its use and maize yields fell (as in Malawi and Zambia). Students who assume liberalized markets automatically lower input costs choose this option.
- C
- Food prices often rose rather than fell after SAPs, because cuts to input subsidies increased production costs for smallholders without improving market efficiency quickly enough.
- E
- Agricultural exports did not immediately compensate; most smallholders grow subsistence crops, and export supply chains take time to develop.
The table shows hypothetical data for five rapidly urbanizing cities in Sub-Saharan Africa.
| City | Annual urban population growth (%) | Annual formal-sector job growth (%) | Residents living in informal settlements (%) |
|---|---|---|---|
| City 1 | 4.8 | 1.2 | 62 |
| City 2 | 4.5 | 4.3 | 18 |
| City 3 | 1.1 | 0.9 | 12 |
| City 4 | 3.0 | 1.5 | 41 |
| City 5 | 2.2 | 2.6 | 9 |
Which of the following conclusions is best supported by the data in the table?
- ACity 4 shows the widest gap between urban population growth and formal job growth, and it also has the largest informal share
- BFast urban population growth alone predicts a large informal share, as City 2 grows nearly as fast as City 1
- CInformal shares fall below 15 percent only in cities whose population grows under 2 percent per year
- DIn City 2, formal job growth exceeds urban population growth, which explains its low informal share
- EInformal shares are highest where urban population growth most outpaces formal job growth, as in Cities 1 and 4Correct
Why E is right
Subtract formal job growth from population growth for each city: City 1 = 3.6 points, City 4 = 1.5, City 2 = 0.2, City 3 = 0.2, City 5 = -0.4. The informal-settlement shares follow the same order (62, 41, 18, 12, 9 percent), so informality is highest where urban population growth most outpaces formal job creation. This pattern is overurbanization: cities grow faster than their economies can absorb migrants into formal jobs and housing, so informal settlements expand.
Why the other 4 choices miss
- A
- Wrong row: City 4's gap is 1.5 points (3.0 - 1.5), but City 1's is 3.6 points (4.8 - 1.2), and City 1, not City 4, has the largest informal share (62%).
- B
- Reads only one column: City 2 grows at 4.5%, close to City 1's 4.8%, but only 18% of its residents live informally because its formal jobs grow almost as fast (4.3%). Fast growth alone does not predict informality.
- D
- Misreads the numbers: City 2's formal job growth (4.3%) is slightly below its population growth (4.5%), not above it. City 5 is the only city where job growth exceeds population growth.
- C
- Contradicted by City 5, which grows at 2.2% per year yet has the lowest informal share (9%). The data tie informality to the gap between growth and jobs, not to a growth threshold.